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PENSIONS, BONDING, AND LIFETIME JOBS
ABSTRACT
A well-known, if underappreciated, finding in the mobility
literature is that turnover is much lower in jobs covered by
pensions than in other jobs. This could result from capital
losses for job changes created by most benefit formulas, the
tendency of turnover-prone individuals to avoid jobs covered by
pensions, or higher overall compensation levels in such jobs. A
switching bivariate probit model of pension coverage and turnover
is developed to estimate the effect of each of these factors.
The results show that capital losses are the main factor
responsible for lower turnover in jobs covered by pensions, but
self-selection and compensation levels also play an important
role. This is the first direct evidence that bonding is
important for understanding long-term employment relationships.
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Each month between 4 and 5 percent of all workers in manufacturing
leave their jobs, a fact frequently cited as evidence of the tremendous amount
of flexibility in the U.S. labor market. Yet among workers who are age 30 or
above, Hall (1982) has shown that 40 percent are working in jobs that will
ultimately last 20 years or more. This apparent paradox is easy to reconcile.
Most young workers go through a period of job shopping before they settle into
a long-term job. Hall finds that the typical American worker will eventually
hold 10 jobs, eight of them by age 40.
Although this profile of mobility over the life-cycle has been well
documented in the literature, the determinants of long-term employment
contracts are still not well understood. One simple explanation is mover-stayer
heterogeneity. The odds of job changing can vary across workers because of
factors such as attitudes and on-the-job behavior which are unobservable to the
person analyzing the data. Although heterogeneity is no doubt an important
factor, it is highly unlikely that it is the only factor influencing job mobility
because it assigns a passive role to employer behavior.
Economic models of long term contracts focus on two mechanisms.
Long-term jobs can result from decisions by firms to pay workers more than
what they can earn elsewhere. A variety of rationales for such behavior have
been offered in the literature, including (but not limited to) economizing on
hiring and training costs (Becker (1975)), preventing shirking (Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984)), and optimal matching of workers and jobs (Jovanovic (1979)).
The other mechanism that can produce long-term employment relationships is
bonding. Up-front fees or bonds are rarely observed in modern American labormarkets, but steep age-earnings profiles and deferred compensation are
equivalent to bonds in terms of their effects on behavior. Bonding discourages
quits (Salop and Salop (1976)) and layoffs for shirking (Lazear (1979,198 1)) by
imposing exit costs on workers who leave the firm. In return, the worker
receives higher lifetime earnings and a commitment from the firm that he will
not be terminated until the end of the contract, even though in some periods he
is paid more than his output. This promise is enforced in the labor market by
the firm's concern about its reputation (and ability to write such contracts in the
future).
Although there are literally dozens of studies of mobility in the economics
literature, no empirical study has examined whether bonding directly lowers
turnover probabilities and most studies ignore nonwage compensation. The
purpose of this paper is to start filling this gap in the literature. Under
reasonable assumptions, defined benefit pension plans have the same characteris-
tics as bonds in the Lazear model. This paper estimates the bondingcomponent
of pensions and shows how it is related to mobility.
The relative impact of wage premiums and bonding on job duration is an
important issue with both theoretical and policy implications. The leading
criticism of efficiency wage models has been that the same productivity gains
could be obtained through bonding without the adverse side effects that
supracompetitive wages have on employment and hours1. Evidence concerning
11n response, advocates of the efficiencywage approach have pointed to
sizable firm expenditures on monitoring as evidence that bonding must be
limited by some constraints. These issues are discussed in Katz (1986) and
Murphy and Topel (1988).
2the magnitude of bonds and the impact of such bonds on worker behavior would
indicate whether this criticism of efficiency wage models has any merit.
Pension bonding is also relevant to the financial question of what explicit
and implicit obligations the employer faces under the pension contract. Bonds
are not observed directly and do not even exist under a strictly legal
interpretation of the pension contract (Bulow (1982)). Evidence that estimates
of bonds are correlated with worker behavior (in this case mobility) would
strengthen the empirical case that the employer's implicit liabilities exceed those
on the balance sheet.
One policy concern is that labor market mobility has fallen below the
efficient rate because of the pension bond that workers lose if they leave the
firm. This is not a new concern; it has been with us at least since the time Ross
(1958) examined the "new industrial feudalism" issue. The recent emphasis on
insufficient mobility is attributed, in large part, to structural changes in the U.S.
economy and the accompanying shifts in the demand for labor. The latest
evidence on mobility trends compiled by Murphy and Topel (1987) shows that
the rate at which workers move across different sectors of the economy has
declined considerably since 1974. Some have suggested that pension regulations
be changed to encourage more mobility. Another controversial policy issue is
the question of whether workers are entitled to a share of any excess assets from
a terminated pension plan as repayment for bonds on which the plan has
defaulted.
To increase our understanding of the process through which workers enter
long-term employment relationships, the paper begins by estimating job retention
rates in the May 1979 and 1983 Current Population Surveys (CPS). Hall has
3used similar data to show how tenure is related to age, sex, and race; Hashimoto
and Raisian (1985) have used the 1979 CPS to show how tenure is related to
firm size. Our results show that pension coverage has been underappreciated
as a determinant ofjob duration; it could very well be the most important factor.
Why do workers stay so long in jobs covered by pensions? One
possibility is that firms with pensions pay more total compensation than other
firms, resulting in lower quit rates. Second, salary-based defmed benefit
pension formulas impose sizable capital losses on those who leave. The capital
loss not only discourages quits, but also lowers layoffs, at least among firms
concerned about their labor market reputations. In addition, the bonding
mechanism acts as a self-selection device to screen out workers who are likely
to quit or be fired. After discussing these competing explanations in some
detail, this paper develops an econometric model to estimate the relative
importance of each factor in the decision to remain on the job.
II. PENSIONS AND JOB DURATION
Although the issue of how pensions affect mobility has been studied
before, the emphasis has been on estimating a pension coverage intercept in a
turnover equation. The questions of whether the impact of pension coverage on
mobility varies with tenure and how much pension coverage matters relative to
other variables have received little attention. In this section we examine these
questions using data from the CPS and the 1975-1982 Panel Survey of Income
Dynamics.
4Two measures of pension coverage are available in the CPS. One
indicator is based upon whether the employer offers a retirement plan (to which
the employer contributes) and does not consider whether workers actually
participate in the plan. We will call this measure of coverage "pension
provision." The other indicator is based upon whether the employee is actually
included in the retirement plan. We will use the term "pension participation"
to refer to this measure.
Reasons for nonparticipation at establishments where pensions are
provided are quite varied. In some cases, not all jobs at an establishment are
covered by the retirement plan. As long as job durations in such situations are
considerably shorter than those in most other jobs, the pension provision
measure understates the impact of pensions on job duration. In other cases, the
worker is a new employee and, although not yet eligible to participate, would
be covered by the retirement plan in a fairly short time should he stay. This
creates a bias in the pension participation measure because it categorizes workers
with little tenure, who will eventually participate in a pension on that job, as not
being covered. In Table 1 we report data on job duration based on the provision
measure.2
Length of service for workers with employers providing pensions is
remarkably longer than that of other workers. In 1979 the mean duration of
workers in jobs where pensions are provided was 8.3 years as compared to 4.0
years for workers in other jobs. The figures for 1983 are comparable; 8.8 years
2The distributions based on the participation measure, available from the
authors, show an even wider difference in job duration between workers
participating in pensions and other workers.
5for workers in jobs where pensions are provided and 4.1 years for workers in
other jobs.3
Data on spells in progress could provide misleading estimates of the
impact of pensions on completed spells and mobility rates if new hire rates in
earlier years vary by pension coverage. Mobility can be estimated by combining
the 1979 and 1983 CPS files to calculate the retention rate, the ratio of 1983 to
1979 employment. Employment estimates are based on the May supplement
sampling weights. The somewhat unorthodox choice of years of service categor-
ies in Table 2 minimizes measurement error caused by the tendency of respon-
dents to report years of service in multiples of five. No adjustments can be
made in the CPS data for the creation or termination of pension plans, thereby
introducing an additional degree of error into the analysis.
Between 1979 and 1983 those in jobs where pension plans are provided
were much more likely to stay in their jobs than other workers, as shown in the
first two rows of Table 2. The retention rate for workers with thirty years or
less of service was 61 percent where pensions were provided in contrast to 41
percent for other workers. Part of this difference results from the fact that most
new employment spells are found in establishments where no pensions are
provided. If persons with zero years of service are excluded from the analysis,
the retention rate for those in jobs where no pensions are provided increases to
3These are employment spells that are still in progress; rough estimates
of the duration of completed spells can be obtained by doubling mean tenure,
an approximation discussed in the context of unemployment durationby
Salant (1977).
650 percent,still substantially below the 66 percent rate for those working where
pensions are provided.4
To determine how the impact of pension coverage on mobility varies with
years of service, Table 2 reports retention rates by pension provision status for
those with less than four years of service in 1979 and by pension participation
status for those with four or more years of service. The rationale for this
approach is that any bias in estimates of pension impact based on the
participation measure should be present only for new workers, whereas the
pension provision measure includes workers who would never be covered by
their employer's plan.
The impact of pensions on mobility declines with years of service. The
difference in mobility rates between workers covered by pensions and other
workers is greatest in both absolute and relative terms for those with eight years
or less of service in 1979. Yet even among workers with 9 to 23 years of
service, the retention rate is still much greater for those participating in pensions
than for those who are not. Retention rates for those with 24 to 28 years of
service are about the same for pension participants and nonparticipants, as both
groups begin to retire in significant numbers.
Pension coverage is correlated with a host of other variables that influence
job duration, including age, sex, firm size, industry, occupation, and
unionization. To determine how much pension coverage affects retention rates,
holding these other variables constant, Table 3 reports some simple length-of-
4when retention rates are broken down by years of service and pension
participation, the retention rate for pension participants becomes twice as high
as the retention rate for nonparticipants (71 versus 34 percent).
7service and mobility results from our own analysis of the PSID and the May
1983 CPS Pension Supplement, along with the findings of six other studies.5
The entries in Table 3 compare the impact of pension coverage with that of $1
an hour additional compensation, one additional year of service, and unioniza-
tion.
In our analysis of the 1983 CPS, years of service among males is
35 percent longer for those whose employers provide pensions; among females,
30 percent longer. Union membership has a more modest impact on length of
service --15percent longer among men and 21 percent longer among women.
An extra dollar of average hourly compensation is associated with an even more
modest 6 to 8 percent increment in length of service. Establishment and firm
size dummies are also included in the model. The results for men are:
Establishment size Firm size





A man employed in an establishment with 1000 or more workers has spent on
average 34 percent more years with his employer than a person employed in a
5McCormick and Hughes (1984) and Ippolito (1985) are excluded from
the table because they interact pension coverage with other variables and do
not report sample means for all variables. Although Wolf and Levy (1984)
estimate hazard functions for length of service separately for workers covered
and not covered by pensions, we exclude their results from the table because
age is the only other variable in their analysis.
8firm with fewer than 25workers,a difference comparable to the impact of
pension coverage. In the female sample, the firm and establishment size
dummies were not significantly correlated with length of service.
Three other studies summarized in Table 3 also show that pensions are
strongly associated with length of service. Both Freeman (1980) and Leigh
(1979) find that pension coverage is the strongest correlate of length of service;
union membership has a sizable but more modest impact. In Rebitzer's (1986)
study of the 1979 CPS, firm and establishment size are the strongest correlates
of years of service, but the impact of pension coverage was still very sizable
relative to the other variables in the analysis.
Pensions also have a very pronounced effect on mobility. In the PSID,
the odds of leaving one's job between 1975 and 1982 are 15 percentage points
lower for those covered by pensions than for other workers, an impact five or
more times larger than that of other variables.6 Mitchell's (1982) analysis of
the 1973-77 Quality of Employment Survey (QES) also finds that among men
pension coverage is the strongest correlate of the probability of a job change.
In Mitchell's analysis of women and in Ippolito (1987), pension coverage and
union membership have comparable impacts on the odds of changing jobs.
Freeman's analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of mature men
between 1969 and 1971 is the only study to examine job changes that did not
find a significant pension impact. Freeman's evidence is consistent with the
6PSID respondents are defined as being covered by a pension if they
answer affirmatively to the question "Are you covered by a company
retirement plan?"
9finding in Table 2 that the impact of pensions on mobility is much smaller
among senior employees.
The correlation between pensions and quits is not as overwhelming as that
between pensions and mobility. In the PSID, quit rates are 9 percentage points
lower for workers covered by pensions. In four other studies, three out of six
estimates fail to find any relationship between pensions and quits. Unionization
is correlated with lower quit rates in every estimate except the PSID, suggesting
that union membership is a better predictor of quit probabilities than pension
coverage.
Further evidence that pensions have a larger effect on total separations
than on quits comes from Department of Labor (1963), which compared annual
separation rates in 1955 by pension coverage, broken down by age group and
firm size. The difference in quit rates by pension coverage is much smaller than
the difference in separation rates, as shown below:
Separation Quit
rate rate
Under 45, pension 42 23
Under 45, no pension 80 33
45-64, pension 16 5
45-64, no pension 46 15
To summarize, we have shown that length of service and job retention
rates in the 1979 and 1983 CPS are both considerably greater for persons
covered by pensions than for other workers. We also have found that the
impact of pension coverage on mobility varies with tenure. It is greatest at low
levels of tenure, but it is sizable at all tenure levels. This suggests that different
10mechanisms may be at work at different career stages. Pension coverage
remains strongly correlated with mobility when we attempt to control for
covariates including age, firm or establishment size, unionization, occupation,
industry, and sex. In most of the evidence presented here, pension coverage has
been the strongest correlate of mobility and length of service, a point that
previous studies have not emphasized. To understand lifetime jobs in the U.S.,
one must understand pensions.
III. HOW PENSIONS AFFECT MOBILITY
Pensions can reduce mobility by imposing a capital loss on those who
leave. Most workers covered by pension plans have their benefits determined
by a formula that multiplies final earnings by a constant and years of service.
As long as workers expect their nominal earnings to rise over time, such
formulas discourage mobility by penalizing workers who leave their jobs. For
instance, consider a case in which a worker earns $20,000 after twenty years
and $40,000 after forty years in the labor market and is covered by a pension
plan that annually will pay him when he retires 1.5 percent of final earnings for
each year of service. If he stays on the same job throughout this period, his
annual benefit will be $24,000 (.0 15 x 40 x $40,000). However, after his twen-
tieth year, if he moves to a new employer who has an identical pension plan and
pays the same wage, his benefit will be only $18,000 (.015 x20 x $20,000 +
.015x 20 x $40,000).
Despite this characteristic of the benefit formula, the existence of a capital
loss hinges upon how much workers pay in each year (via reduced earnings) for
11their pensions. Under the legal interpretation of the pension contract described
in Bulow (1982), workers pay only for the benefits to which they are legally
entitled. In the case above, a worker with twenty years of service pays for a
pension based on a final salary of $20,000 rather than one based on an expected
final salary of $40,000. Under the legal pension contract, this worker has
nothing to lose if he leaves the firm.
Ippolito shows that there must be an implicit contract between the firm
and the worker for a capital loss to exist.7 Under this contract the worker
expects to continue to be employed with the same firm until retirement and pays
each year for a pension based on his expected final earnings ($40,000 in the
example). The present value of his expected pension benefits is called the "stay
pension." Assume for simplicity that worker i survives to retirement with
certainty and that pension benefits are paid in a lump sum (B1) at retirement date
R and are based on the formula B1 =AS1Y1(t),where Y(t) indicates earnings
at each date, S indicates years of service, and A is a constant reflecting plan
generosity. At time t (t<R), the stay pension is
(1) SP1 =ASYj(R)e1(l0,
where Y(R) is expected final earnings. If he leaves the firm, the worker
receives only the benefits to which he is legally entitled, AS,Y1(t). This will be
7me concept of such a capital loss was introduced by McCormick and
Hughes (1984) and was integrated into models of financial and labor market
behavior by Ippolito (1985, 1987).
12less than AS1Y(R) as long as Y(t) < Y1(R). The present value of AS1Y(t) is
called the "leave pension,"
(2) LP1 =AS1Y(t)et)
The capital loss (CL1) is the difference between the stay and the leave pension,
(3) CL1 =AS1[Y1(R)-Y1(t)}e(t)
The traditional explanation given for lower mobility under pensions has
been the impact of vesting rules. A person who leaves a job before he is vested
is not entitled to pension benefits from that job upon retirement. The impact of
vesting is expressed by (3) by assuming Y1(t) =0for unvested workers.
8Before the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was
passed in 1974, there were no restrictions on vesting provisions. In some
cases a worker had to stay with the firm until he reached retirement age to be
vested. Kolodrubetz and Landay (1973) found that in a 1972 sample
restricted to workers aged 50 or above with 10 or more years of service, only
half those covered by pensions were fully vested. In such a regulatory
environment it is quite easy to see how this explanation became conventional.
After ERISA was enacted, most firms adopted policies to vest workers fully
after 10 years of service. Such vesting policies are likely to have little effect
on turnover because the gain in pension wealth at the point of vesting is
actually quite small for most workers, as shown by Kotlikoff and Wise
(1985). Schiller and Weiss (1979) examine the impact of vesting on mobility
in the pre-ERISA era; Wolf and Levy (1984) examine mobility before and
after ERISA.
13Estimates of this loss based on representative samples of actual pension
plans are reported in Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1988). Using pension data
from the 1983 Employee Benefit Survey of Medium and Large Firms and data
on workers from the May 1983 CPS, Allen, Clark, and McDermed estimate that
the pension loss roughly is between half and two-thirds of earnings for workers
aged 40 to 55inmost occupations and industries.9
When one also takes into account the shorter time horizon over which
these workers can recoup these losses through higher earnings at some
alternative employment, the capital loss could conceivably be a powerful
impediment to mobility and shirking within this age group. Furthermore, under
Lazear's model, if a firm is concerned about its reputation in the labor market
and its ability to write underpay-early/overpay-later contracts in the future, the
capital loss should also be associated with fewer layoffs. This theory is
consistent with the higher retention rates for pension participants among workers
with nine or more years of service in Table 2.
This still leaves unaddressed the fact that most mobility is concentrated
among young workers with relatively little service. Table 2 demonstrated that
pension coverage drastically reduces mobility among those with fewer than four
years of service. These workers face negligible capital losses if they leave their
jobs. However, the prospect of suffering a sizable capital loss in the future
operates as a self-selection device matching stable workers with jobs covered by
pensions.
9A different measure of the capital loss associated with leaving one's job
that explicitly incorporates assumptions about the odds of staying on the job
an extra year is developed in Lazear and Moore (1988).
14This can be seen through the following simple example. Suppose there
are two types of workers, with quit probabilities m and s, with m >s.These
differences could arise from expected differences in the value of nonmarket time
or in mobility costs. A firm that must invest a great deal in worker-specific
training will want to attract the s-applicants. This can be done by setting up a
compensation system that includes a pension with delayed vesting and an
earnings-based formula.10 This will discourage the rn-applicants. It will also
encourage the s-applicants if they end up receiving more compensationthan they
could elsewhere, as they would under certain efficiency wage models. The
result is a set of employees with lower initial odds of leaving the firm. A
similar argument is presented formally in Viscusi (1985) with several interesting
extensions involving the precision of prior quit probability assessments and
on-the-job learning. The self-selection of m and s-applicants generated by
bonding can account for the relatively large retention rates among workers in
Table 2 who have little tenure on jobs covered by pensions, but it cannot
account for the impact of pensions on turnover among more senior workers (all
of whom should be s-applicants).
Besides bonding, the other rationale for the greater length of service and
lower mobility rates observed under pensions is that it merely reflects a higher
overall level of compensation. Economic models of mobility imply that quit
rates are inversely related to the difference between compensation at one's
current and one's best alternative job. Assuming that alternative compensation
is held constant through variables representing human capital and other
101t can also be done with any other deferred compensation scheme.
15individual characteristics, higher wage rates and pension coverage both should
be associated with lower quit rates.
All of the studies summarized in Table 3 included wages or earnings as
a control variable. It could be that if one could hold total current compensation
constant, pension coverage would no longer be related to mobility. However,
high levels of current compensation relative to alternative compensation may
also be associated with greater layoff probabilities, making the direction of the
overall linkage between pay levels and mobility ambiguous, a point raised in
Ante! (1985). Another problem with this rationale is that it cannot by itself
explain why the impact of pensions on mobility in Table 2 falls with tenure.
Pension compensation is either a constant or rising share of total compensation,
so one would expect the impact of pensions on mobility either to stay the same
or to increase with seniority if compensation levels were mainly responsible for
the correlation between pension coverage and mobility.
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The strategy used in this paper to model the sorting of workers into jobs
by pension coverage is to estimate a three equation model of pension coverage,
turnover in pension jobs, and turnover in jobs without pensions. Sorting is
based on observable and unobservable characteristics of the worker and the job.
Even when deferred compensation eliminatesmany turnover-prone applicants for
a job, firms continue to have an incentive to select those with the lowest odds
of turnover other things equal. Variables such as schooling andage could act
16as signals of employment stability that influence how workers are matched with
employers providing job-specific training. This requires a model that will treat
sorting based on observable characteristics as well those that are unobservable
(at least in our data set).
Separate estimation of pension and turnover equations identifies sorting
effects (e.g., married applicants are more likely to be hired into pension jobs
where turnover odds are low for all workers) versus effects that are conditional
on sorting (e.g., married workers have lower turnover odds). Separate mobility
equations by pension status also distinguish whether turnover is lower in pension
jobs because the intercept of the mobility function is lower or because the
responsiveness of mobility to exogenous variables is lower. For instance one
would expect an rn-applicant to have higher turnover odds than an s-applicant
and may even be more responsive to a dollar of additional hourly compensation
than an s-applicant.These are testable hypotheses in our approach.
Correlations between the mobility equations and the pension coverage equation
are estimated to determine the role of unobservables in the sorting process.
The model also estimates how the possibility of suffering a capital loss of
pension wealth influences the sorting process.Presumably persons who
anticipate a large capital loss on a pension job will prefer to take a job without
a pension. This hypothesis can be tested by including the expected cost of
leaving a pension job as a right-hand variable in the pension equation.
The model consists of three equations
(4) T= + 1121'1CL1+
(5) T; = + B22CL1+
(6) = +
17where P is a latent variable indicating the odds that a particular worker will be
covered by a pension; T1 and T are latent variables indicating the odds of
leaving a job with a pension (P) and without a pension (N); X1, X21, and X31
are vectors of control variables; 't'= Prob(T> 0); and N(0,a),2i
—N(O,o),— N(0,oj),E(€11c2) =a12,E(11€31) =13and E(E21€3)= 0.
Equation (4) indicates how expected mobility costs influence the assign-
ment of workers to jobs by pension coverage. A more structural model that
would take into account the linkage between pension choice and thejob matching
process is beyond the scope of this paper because pension coverage is known at
only one point in time in our data.
Workers are assumed to take jobs with pensions if the value of the
pension-covered job (including compensation and nonmonetary considerations)
exceeds that of a job without a pension. They are more likely to be covered by
pensions when they face high marginal tax rates. Pensions delay taxes until
retirement, a time when most people expect to be in lower marginal tax brack-
ets. The value of tax postponement typically is greater for those currently in
high tax brackets. Total compensation and the marginal tax rate are included
in X1 for this reason. Firms have an incentive to provide pensions when
monitoring costs are high (to reduce shirking) or when they have high hiring and
training costs (to reduce turnover). To control for these factors, years of
schooling and industry and occupation dummies are included in X11. Unionized
establishments are also more likely to provide pensions, as discussed in Freeman
(1985).Sorting into pension jobs is likely to be based on observable
characteristics such as age, schooling, race, marital status, and number of
18children, all of which are included in X11. Tenure is also included to account
for the fact that pension participation at some employers depends on years of
service.
When workers choose jobs with pensions, they also choose a set of
specific pension plan characteristics, including the benefit formula determining
CL1. Key variables in this matching process include worker attitudes toward
risk bearing, the amount of information they have about the plan, and their
expected odds of staying with the plan. Workers who do not expect to stay at
a pension job should be less likely to be observed in such jobs because holding
other things equal, including total compensation before taxes (regular earnings
and pension compensation combined), they would expect a capital loss.
In a world of perfect information, workers would base their pension
choice decision on the expected cost of leaving a pension job, the product ofl'p1
and CL1. In practice it is much more likely that workers know t'p1thanthe
magnitude of the function generating CL1 before (or even after) accepting a
job.11 Accordingly we also consider a variant of (4) where pension coverage
is related solely to
(4') P7 = + B121'1+
andestimate (4') jointly with (5)and(6). In this formulation the capital loss
affects pension coverage only indirectly through its effect on turnover.
"Many workers do not know the most basic characteristics of a pension
such as whether early retirement is provided or whether employees contribute
to the plan, as shown in Mitchell (1988).
19Observable factors in the process matching workers with employers by
pension coverage are modelled in (4), whereas the role of unobservable factors
is estimated by a12 and cr13. The signs of a12 and Cr13cannotbe predicted ex
ante. Generally one would expect more stable workers to be in pension jobs,
making a12 <0,but if observable factors play the predominant role in the
matching process, the value of a12 could be zero. The sign of a13 could be
negative if workers with high odds of pension coverage are more stable regard-
less of whether they are covered by a pension. Alternatively, it could be
positive if there is queuing for pension jobs. In this latter case, those with high
odds of pension coverage who land in a job without a pension are more likely
to leave because they prefer a job with a pension.
The impact of CL1 and compensation levels on turnover in pension jobs
is estimated in (5).Thevalidity of the bonding hypothesis is indicated by B2.
The hourly compensation variable in X2 and X31 is calculated on an after-tax
basis. To determine whether persons with pensions stay on their jobs longer
merely because they are paid better, we include pension compensation (PC1) in
the compensation variable. Pension compensation is the change in pension
wealth obtained by staying an extra year with an employer (dLP1/dS1). We
assume that a person on the margin of leaving a job will define PC1 according
to the "leave pension" definition in (2).
The impact of vesting rules on mobility is an interesting policy question.
This issue is examined by including two binary variables in X21: one indicating
whether the respondent was vested at the beginning of the sample period and
another indicating whether the respondent became vested during the sample
period. We assume that all workers are 100 percent vested at 10 years of
20service but are completely unvested beforehand. This assumption was the
predominant practice under ERISA in the sample period examined below.
Worker and job characteristics, along with regional dummy variables, are also
included in X2 and X31.
An alternative model for estimating pension effects on mobility has been
developed by Gustman and Steinmeier (1987, 1990). They estimate the effect
of lifetime compensation premiums on mobility using the 1983 Survey of
Consumer Finances (SCF) and the 1984-1985 Survey of Income and Program
Participation. The premium estimate is the difference in lifetime wage and
pension income between the current and alternative job. It contains the pension
bond and the efficiency wage premium. Their approach differs from ours in
two important respects. First, Gustman and Steinmeier do not model the sorting
of workers into jobs by pension coverage. Second, Gustman and Steinmeier
model alternative compensation explicitly, equating it to income on the new job,
a variable observable only for job changers, who are not likely to be a random
subsample, and not known even by them except on an basis. Because
of the inherent difficulties in estimating lifetime alternative compensation
ex ante, we restrict our attention to the linkage between current pay levels and
mobility.
Parameter estimates for (4), (5),and(6) can be estimated using standard
maximum likelihood methods. The parameters of (5)and(6) are identified
through sample separation and (4) is identified through exclusion restrictions.
In the data, only the dichotomous counterparts of P7, T, and T1 are observed,
P =1if P7 >0,0 otherwise.
21If covered,
=1if T > 0, 0 otherwise,
and if not covered,
TNj =1if T1 > 0, 0 otherwise.
Therefore the variances of the disturbance terms are normalized to one. The
resulting joint probability distribution of (P,TP,TN) is given as
P11 =Prob(P=1,T 1) =F[fi1X11+ CLi, B1X21 + J22CL; p12]
P10 =Prob(P=1,T =0)=F[B1X1+ CL1, -(J1X2 + B22CL); -p12]
P01 =Prob(P=0,TN1) =F[-(11X11+ B12T1 CLi), B1X31; p13]
=Prob(P=0,TN =0)=F[-(B1X11+ CLi), -B1X31; P13],
whereF(.) denotes the bivariate cumulative normal distribution, P12 denotes the
correlation coefficient between P and T, and P13denotesthe correlation
coefficient between P and TN. The likelihood function to be maximized is
L(81,fi2,B3) =pP1T 10P1(1_Tp).p (lPj)TNI. p(l-P)(lTN)
The results reported below are estimated with the Davidon, Fletcher, and Powell
method.12 Estimates of the asymptotic covariance matrix arecomputed using
the Berndt et al. estimator.
12Experimentation with other algorithms (Newton's method), various
convergence criteria, and alternative starting values showed them to be quite
stable with respect to the optimization procedure.
22V. DATA DESCRIPTION
In most longitudinal micro data sets there are annual observations for each
variable, allowing the researcher to use fixed effects or pooled time-series and
cross-section estimation procedures. This cannot be done here because no
longitudinal data set reports pension coverage on a regular basis. The PSID
reports pension coverage in 1975, but not againuntil 1984. Because we are
concerned with job duration, we focus on the PSIt) data between 1975 and
1982, the last year of data available at the time this study was started. The
alternative was to consider a shorter interval. We chose not to do this because
the turnover rate for persons covered by pensions is extremely low.
Unfortunately, the PSID provides little information on pension plan
characteristics. The PSID reports in the 1975 survey whether the respondent is
"covered by a company retirement plan." The pension benefit formula and
eligibility criteria for benefits are needed to calculate CL1.
These variables were imputed from the 1983 Employee Benefit Survey for
Medium and Large Firms (EBS) in the following way. Plans in the EBS were
sorted into eight industry and three occupational classifications.
13Withineach
industry-occupation cell there are as many as five different types of pension
formulas (e.g., simple earnings-based or dollar per year of service). The
formula type that covered the largest proportion of participants within each cell
131n the construction industry we did not make any breakdowns by
occupation because of the extremely small number of observationsin the
EBS.
23was assumed to apply to all participants in that cell. The mean parameter values
for that formula type are used as the estimate of the benefit formula for all PSID
respondents in a given industry-occupation category. For earnings-based for-
mulas, the key parameters are the generosity factor (percentage of average
earnings) and the length of the salary averaging period. Age and service
requirements for normal retirement in the EBS were assumed to be equal to cell
means, based on all plans in the cell regardless of formula type.
Given the benefit formula, it is straightforward to calculate PC and CL1
with information on age, earnings history and years of service given by PSID
respondents. The value of a life antuity beginning at the normal retirement age
was calculated and discounted to age at the time of the survey. The discount
factor used was 9 percent; this value corresponds to long-term top-grade bond
rates during this period. Survival probabilities by sex and race were set equal
to those for the U.S. population for 1981.14 The sample is restricted to whites
and blacks because survival probabilities for other racial groups are not
reported. We assume no postretirement adjustments in benefits are provided.
To calculate Y(R) we assume that earnings are projected forward to the age of
eligibility at the interest rate, following Ippolito (1985).'
The PSID sample consists of private wage and salary workers who were
employed at the time of the 1975 survey and reported earnings. The sample is
restricted to heads of households under age 55 in 1975 who were working 35 or
14U.S. Bureau of the Census (1984), Table 104,p. 70.
151n dollar-per-year-of-service formulas, we assume the dollar amount in
the formula is projected forward at the interest rate.
24more hours per week.16 Those working in occupations or industries not
represented in the EBS files were deleted.17 Observations withmissing values
of the variables were also dropped from the sample. Out of the 6,740
households in the PSID, 1,111 observations met our criteria.18 The focus of
the empirical analysis of the PSID below will be on whether the respondent left
his 1975 employer by 1982.19 We also will examine terminations resulting
from layoffs and decisions to quit to find another job.2° All independent
variables are based on information from the 1975 survey except for the pension
variables, which rely on earnings data from as far back as the 1970 survey, and
16A small percentage of respondents claim to be retiring at the time they
leave their 1975 job, but in subsequent surveys many of them report that they
are working full time. The sample restriction on age removes almost all of
the respondents who seem to have permanently retired from the sample.
17Persons employed in the following PSID industrial categories are
excluded: agriculture, forestry, fishing, and trade, NA whether wholesale or
retail. Occupations excluded include farmers, farm managers, and
miscellaneous occupations.
18Splitoff families are excluded from the sample to facilitate data base
management. Persons who were self-employed in any year of the survey are
excluded to focus the analysis on wage and salary workers.
19Turnover is defined according to the reason given by the respondent
why he left his previous job. If that job ended because of a plant closing,
strike, layoff or dismissal, quit, or other reason or because it was a
temporary job that had been completed, the dependent variable is set equal to
one.
20Layoffs are defined as terminations resulting from plant closings,
layoffs, or dismissals. If a person quit his previous job and was either
employed or unemployed at the time he was surveyed, he is labelled below as
someone who quit to find another job. If a person quit and was out of the
labor force at the time of the survey, he is labelled below as someone who
quit to exit the labor force.
25the federal marginal tax rate, which comes from the 1976 survey but is based
on 1975 income. Average hourly compensation equals the sum of average
hourly earnings, as reported directly on the survey, and average hourly pension
compensation, which is obtained by dividing PC by the product of average
weeldy hours and weeks worked.
The other variables in X1 include union status, age, years of service and
its square, number of children, years of schooling, sex, race, marital status,
occupation, industry, and location. They are intended to control for observable
forms of heterogeneity.
To sunmiarize the significant patterns in the data, Table 4 reports mean
values of selected variables by age group and mobility. The share of workers
who left their 1975 job ranges from 66 percent for the under 25 group to 35
percent for the 45-54 group. Within each age group, those who stay with their
1975 employers (stayers) are much more likely to be covered by a pension than
those who leave their 1975 employers (movers). Movers tend to have lower
average hourly compensation and fewer years of service than stayers; movers
are also more likely to be females or blacks. The rate of union membership is
much greater for stayers than for movers among workers under 35, but is about
the same for stayers and movers among older workers.
The mean value of the capital loss variable is quite low for the younger
age groups, especially relative to the number of years they are likely to remain
in the labor force. For instance, among workers covered by pensions, the mean
capital loss is $821 for those under age 25 and $2,926 for those between 25 and
34. Assuming persons in the latter group work another thirty years, this
amounts to $260 per year of remaining worklife at an 8 percent discount rate.
26The capital loss averages $6,526 for the 35-44 group; if they work twenty
additional years, this amounts to $664 per year of remaining worklife. For the
45-54 group the mean capital loss is $8,503 for those covered by pensions,
meaning that workers in this age group would have to earn $1,267 extra per
year on any alternative job to offset the capital loss over a ten-year period. The
mean capital loss of stayers is much greater than that of movers in all four age
groups; the difference is largest in absolute dollar terms in the 45-54 group.
Sample means by pension coverage are reported in Table 5. Workers
covered by pensions are older, have more years of service, have more
schooling, and are more likely to be union members that other workers. In
terms of demographic characteristics, workers covered by pensions are more
likely to be white, male, married, and to have more children. Compensation is
much larger for workers covered by pensions.
We examined a number of surveys besides the PSID and CPS for assess-
ing the effect of pensions on job mobility. Because of its unique and detailed
pension information, the 1983 SCF appeared to be a likely candidate for
inclusion in our study. However, this is a cross-sectional data set with limited
information on employment history. The lack of data on earnings and pension
characteristics on previous jobs is a serious shortcoming in employing the 1983
SCF for estimating turnover equations. In addition, Gustman and Steinmeier
(1987) had to impute pension benefit formulas and eligibility criteria for
41 percent of the workers covered by pensions in their analysis of 1983 SCF
because pension plan descriptions were not provided.
Recently, a 1986 follow-up to the SCF became available. The possibility
of a panel survey that contained detailed pension information on the 1983 job
27suggests that the two SCF surveys would be an excellent data source for estimat-
ingjob change equations. Unfortunately, the sample design of the 1986 survey
did not include a reinterview of all 1983 respondents and there was a relatively
high attrition rate (32 percent). Furthermore, about one-third of the attrition
consists of households that were "not located" for the 1986 survey. Since
change of residence is likely to be highly correlated with job change, the
sampling has probably systematically eliminated many job changers from the
1986 sample. While we are still exploring the usefulness of both the 1983 SCF
alone and the 1983-1986 surveys jointly, it is our current assessment that the
gain in pension information on these surveys is outweighed by the cost of
missing data on previous jobs in the 1983 survey and missing respondents in the
1983-1986 panel.
VI. RESULTS
Before reporting the results for the complete system of equations, it is
instructive to examine the results for some simpler models. First consider a
simple turnover equation with X31 and a pension coverage dummy as right-hand
side variables. Next replace the pension coverage dummy with CL1 and then in
a third equation include both CL1 and the pension dummy. When these models
are estimated over the sample used for the complete system, one obtains the
following probit coefficients (standard errors are in parentheses and partial
derivatives evaluated at the sample means are in brackets):








-0.260 -0.024 -0.042 -679.9
(0.104) (0.013) (0.031)
[-0.103] [-0.010] [-0.016]
In this model a $1000 increase in CL1 is associated with a 1.0 to 1.4 percentage
point reduction in turnover. The addition of CL1 to the equation reduces the
pension coefficient by about 20 percent. The coefficient of the hourly
compensation variable is quite sensitive to the inclusion of CL1 in the equation,
but all other coefficients are fairly stable. The results for CL1 are quite similar
in a bivariate probit model of pensions and turnover where 12in(4) is
restricted to equal zero and the parameters of turnover equations (5) and (6) are
restricted to be the same. The estimated correlation between the pension
coverage and turnover error terms is -0.140 with a standard error of 0.063,
indicating that, even after controlling for observable characteristics, workers
-who are most likely to be observed in pension jobs are still less likely to leave
those jobs.
The main results for the complete systems reported in Table 6 are as
follows:
291. A key reasonwhy lowerturnover is observed among workers covered
by pensions is the prospect of capital losses of pension wealth. The impactof
a $1000 increase in the capital loss is a 1.8 percentage point reductionin the
odds of turnover. To put this result in perspective, note that the average worker
covered by a pension faced a $5024 capital loss in 1975 if he left his job. This
translates into a turnover probability differential of 9 percentage points. The
seven-year turnover rate was 39 percent for personscovered by pensions and
61 percent for persons not covered. Thus the capital loss accounts for about
41 percent of the turnover difference between these two groups.
The capital loss effect in the complete system is twice as large as in the
simple single equation estimates noted above. This results from allowing the
parameters of (5) and (6) to be different from each other to reflect sorting. To
see this, compare the results in Table 5 to those obtained from a bivariate probit
model consisting of a pension choice equation (4) (with 1312=0) and (5)
estimated over all workers with P12 as a free parameter. In this model the CL
coefficient is -.023, comparable to the simple probit results above, but a
likelihood ratio test rejects the restrictions that 2l =-31 and 1312=0. The
simpler restriction that 1312=0 cannot be rejected.
2. There is self-selection of workers with low odds of turnover into jobs
covered by pensions but it is based on observable rather than unobservable
characteristics. Turnover in our sample is lower for men, whites, union
members, and those who are married than for women, blacks, nonunion
workers, and those who are not married. In addition turnover falls rapidly with
30years of service.21Sex, race, union membership, and marital status are
associated with pension coverage in the estimates of (4), whereas none of these
variables are associated with turnover conditional on pension coverage in the
estimates of (5)and(6).
Another indication of self-selection is that the response to changes in
right-hand side variables varies considerably by pension coverage.The
hypothesis that the coefficients of the two equations are equal is rejected by a'
likelihood ratio test. Turnover in jobs covered by pensions is mainly related to
age, industry, and CL1; turnover in other jobs is strongly related to years of
service, region, and occupation. The intercept of the turnover equation is also
much greater for workers without pensions.
The difference in the parameters between (5)and(6) is much more
important than the difference in the means of the control variables between
workers with and without pensions for explaining the observed difference in
turnover rates. Predicted turnover for workers covered by pensions using the
parameters of (5)is34 percent, whereas predicted turnover for those without
pensions based on the same parameters is 40 percent. Workers with pensions
would have had a turnover rate of 56percent,based on the parameters of (6),
not much smaller than the 65percentturnover rate predicted for those without
pensions.
21These results are based on a simple probit equation estimated across
our entire sample without any pension variables. Details are available upon
request.
31There is no correlation between the unobservables in the pension coverage
and either of the turnover equations. The restriction that P12=P13 =0 cannot be
rejected by a likelihood ratio test at a 5 percent confidence level.
3. The expected magnitude of the capital loss has little effect on the
sorting of workers by pension coverage. Despite this evidence on self-selection,
the data do not indicate any direct link between the size of the expected capital
loss and the odds of being in a job with a pension. Neither l'pjCLnor lpj
aresignificantly related to pension coverage, and contrary to expectations the
coefficient is positive. The mean partial derivative of P with respect to CL in
(4) is also positive. A more complete model that takes into account income
profiles along with the transaction cost of switching out of a pension job is
probably needed to make more progress on this issue. Also, even though years
of service, compensation, industry and occupation are all 'held constant" in (4),
large values of CL1 reflect pension generosity as well.
4. Pension compensation has little effect on turnover, but the higher
overall level of compensation associated with pension coverage leads to lower
turnover.Pension compensation is a very small component of total
compensation for most workers covered by pensions. The mean value of hourly
pension compensation for such workers is 7.3 cents in 1975; for all but a few
workers, it is well under a dollar. This fact alone makes it unlikely that the
extra compensation associated with pension jobs explains much of the observed
turnover difference.
Even though pension compensation is a relatively small component of total
compensation, the gap in total compensation between jobs with and without
32pensions is quite large. The effect of a change in compensation on the odds of
turnover must be evaluated using the entire system (4)-(6). Based on the
coefficients from System A in Table 6, a one dollar increase in before-tax
compensation is associated with a 1.8 percentage point decrease in the odds of
turnover (almost exactly the same as our estimate in panel B of Table 3). If the
$2.05 difference in compensation between jobs with and without pensions were
eliminated, the gap in turnover rates by pension coverage would narrow by
3.7 percentage points, accounting for 17 percent of the turnover difference
between the two groups.
5. There is no change in turnover at the point of vesting. The restriction
that the two vesting dummy variables in (5) equals zero cannot be rejected at
conventional significance levels. This is not surprising in that CL takes into
account changes in LP1 at vesting. The partial effect of tenure on mobility in
(5) does switch from negative to positive at 10 years of service, but the
magnitude of this derivative is quite small in this range (e.g., -.014 at 10 years
and .008 at 15 years).
Beyond these key issues addressed by the results in Table 5, two other
important questions can be addressed with our model and data.First, what
types of turnover does the capital loss affect? Because we are unable to reject
the hypotheses that fi12=0 and P12=P13=°' this question can be answered by
simply estimating (5) for the two different types of turnover: quitting to take
another job and layoffs. The results, reported in Table 7, show that the impact
of CL clearly is greatest on layoffs. Layoff probabilities fall by 1.3 percentage
points with a $1,000 increase in CLi. This finding is consistent with models of
33pensions being part of an implicit contract where bonding prevents shirking and
reputational concerns prevent employers from pocketing CL1 by firing their
workers. The much smaller effect of CL1 on quits is puzzling, although
previous studies summarized in Table 3 tend to find pension coverage to be
more strongly correlated with mobility in general than quits in particular.
Second, what is the association between mobility and wages and how does
it vary by pension coverage? Between 1975 and 1982, average hourly earnings
grew by 103 percent for workers who stayed at a 1975 job that was covered by
a pension, whereas earnings growth was slightly lower (95 percent) for those
who left such a job. Among those not covered by a pension in 1975, movers
enjoyed wage growth of 113 percent versus 98 percent for stayers. In contrast
to Gustman and Steinmeier (1987, 1990), the breakdowns of earnings growth by
mobility and pension coverage in our sample shows no evidence that workers
covered by pensions are collecting rents.
The estimates of CL1 are based on average pension characteristics in a
given industry by occupation category, not the actual pension for the worker.
The variation of CL1 across the persons in the sample reflects their seniority,
age, and earnings history as well as estimates of the benefit formula and
eligibility criteria that are measured with an unknown amount of error. If errors
in measuring these provisions of the pension are sufficiently large, then CL1 is
little more than a nonlinear combination of past earnings, seniority, and age.
A skeptic could argue that there is really no new information in CL1 that is not
already contained elsewhere in the model.
This criticism can be addressed in two ways.First, if there is no
additional information in CL1, then the hypothesis that its coefficient is zero
34should not be rejected. One would also expect the estimated effects of
compensation and seniority to be considerably larger without CL1 in the model.
Second, if CL1 contains no information about pension bonding and is merely
picking up the effects of compensation and seniority on turnover, then it should
have the same effect in (6) as it does in (5) --CL1should be a good predictor
of turnover in jobs without pensions and the coefficients of compensation and
seniority in (6) should diminish. This can be determined by adding CL1 to (6)
and testing whether its coefficient is zero.
The data strongly reject both of these conjectures. Exclusion of CL1 from
(4) and (5) is rejected by a likelihood ratio test at the five percent confidence
level. In the restricted specification the compensation coefficient in (5) remains
negligible in magnitude and is estimated with little precision. The magnitude
and precision of the tenure variables do increase, however. When CL is added
to (6), its coefficient (S.E.) is -.008 (.053) and the compensation and seniority
parameters are unaffected. The conclusion to draw from these exercises is that
CL1 contains useful information for predicting turnover that is not contained in
other variables in the model and that information is relevant only for jobs
covered by pensions.
VII. CONCLUSION
The mechanisms through which pension coverage reduces labor mobility
are the large capital losses in pension wealth associated with leaving a job and
the matching of more stable workers with firms that provide pensions and higher
overall levels of compensation in those jobs. These conclusions follow from
35econometric evidence from the PSID. They are also consistent with the
evidence in Table 2 on how pensions affect mobility at different tenure levels.
Do the capital loss results imply that Ross was premature in dismissing
the new industrial feudalism hypothesis? Are many workers trapped injobs they
do not like because they fear they will lose tens of thousands of dollars in
pension wealth? The answers to these questions hinge on whether capital losses
reduce mobility mainly through quits or layoffs. Our results indicate that the
capital loss has a much larger effect on layoffs than quits. In addition, previous
studies summarized in Table 3 tend to find a much stronger correlation between
coverage and mobility in general than between coverage and quits. If the
quit-layoff distinction is a meaningful one, these results imply that pension plan
parameters such as benefit formulas and vesting criteria have had a relatively
small direct impact on quit decisions. The lower quit rate for workers covered
by pensions seems to come mainly from self-selection. This suggests that public
policy measures that have been proposed to increase labor market flexibility by
changing the terms of pension contracts to make pension wealth more portable
across employers will have little impact on mobility.22
These findings on pension capital losses are the first evidence that bonding
directly affects employee behavior and that it is an important cause of lifetime
jobs in the U.S. Extreme conclusions on the roles of bonding and efficiency
wages in explaining job duration cannot be drawn from this result. The result
certainly does not imply that firms are unconstrained in setting bonds. It does
22For a discussion of such proposals, see Choate and Linger (1986) and
Clark and McDermed (1988).
36imply that bonding should be taken seriously as an important component of the
implicit pension contract.
These results are consistent with models of implicit contracts for lifetime
jobs. Although employers seemingly would gain tremendous windfalls by ter-
minating workers who have paid for stay pensions but legally stand to collect
leave pensions, this opportunistic behavior apparently is being held in check by
some force such as the cost of finding and training replacements or concern over
labor market reputation. Reputational considerations also seem to explain why
many employers provide large postretirement increases in benefits even when
they are not contractually obliged to do so. However, every firm does not
keep its implicit pension promises; the question of when firms decide to renege
on implicit contracts requires further study.
23Postretirement increases in pension benefits are examined in more detail
in Allen, Clark, and Sumner (1986).
37Table 1.Percentage distribution of years of service by pension provision status,













0 26.4 34.3 16.9 21.6 30.7 10.4
1 9.7 11.8 8.0 9.6 12.4 6.8
2 11.0 13.3 9.8 12.0 14.0 10.1
3-4 12.3 13.6 12.0 15.4 15.8 15.6
5-9 17.0 14.7 19.9 17.7 14.4 21.6
0-14 9.7 5.9 12.9 9.6 6.0 13.4
5-19 5.0 2.5 7.1 5.9 3.0 9.1
20-29 6.3 2.6 9.2 5.5 2.3 8.9
30+ 2.6 1.4 4.2 2.7 1.4 4.1
Mean 6.2 4.0 8.3 6.3 4.1 8.8
Employment
(millions)
67.9 24.7 38.1 71.3 30.0 35.8
Source:Calculated from May 1979 and 1983 CPS public use tapes, using
sampling weights for pension supplement.
Note: Totals for all workers in each year includes workers who did not report pension
coverage. Over half of these workers have zero or one year of service with
their employers.
38Table 2.Four-year retention rates by pension





1979 1983 pension bypension
0-30 4-34 .608 .406
1-30 5-34 .656 .497
0-3 4-7 .490 .313
4-8 8-12 .715 .473
9-13 13-17 .748 .641
14-18 18-22 .756 .714
19-23 23-27 .804 .688
24-28 28-32 .581 .601
Source: Same as Table 1.
Note: Retention rate estimates for those with four or
more years of service in 1979 are broken down by
pension participation status; all other estimates are
broken down by pension provision status.
39Table 3. Estimates of the impact of pension coverage and other variables on length of service
and mobility
Impact on dependent variableof
Source (if $1in average One Union
published Dependent Pension hourly additional member-
elsewhere) DataSet variable3 coveragecompensatior?year of serviceCship
A. Length of Service Estimates
CPS, 1983
Males Ln(years of
service) .30 .06 n.a. .14
Females Ln(,years of
service) .26 .08 n.a. .19
Rebitzer (1986)CPS,1979
Males Years of .08 .37 na. .39
service
Females Years of .90 .49 n.a. 1.57
service
Freeman (1980) NLS mature Years of
men service
1969-71 in 1969 4.65 .43 n.a. 2.96




in 1969 .61 .44 n.a. 2.31
Blacks Years of
service
in 1969 3.71 .43 n.a. 3.58
B. Mobility estimates
PSID, Probability of-.15 -.02 -.03 n.s.
1975-82 job change




Males Job change .63 -.10 -.04 n.s
probit
Females Job change -.40 na. na. -.46
probit





Males Quit probit -.44 n.s. -.11 -.39
Females Quit probit n.s. n.s. n.s. -.62
Freeman (1980) NLS mature Quit logk na. n.s. -.24 -1.85
men, 1969-71
Viscusi (1979) NLSmature Quit Iogi -.83 n.s. -.17 -1.62
men, 1969-7 1
Leigh (1979) NLS mature
men, 1969-il
Whites Quit probit -1.53 -.10 -- -.87
Blacks Quit probit na. na. -- -1.01
aWhCfl authors estimated probit equations and reported derivatives of the equation at the sample means, the
derivatives are reported in the table. Otherwise, the actual probit (or logi) equation coefficients are reported and the
dependent variable is referred to as probit (or logit).
b10 studies where this variable is expressed in logs, we assume that this is equivalent to a .18 change in logs (the
logarithmic difference between SS and S6).
1n studies where this variable is entered quadratically, we estimate thc derivative in the neighborhood of five
years of service and 35 years of age.
Note: n.s. indicates the coefficient was not statistically significant at a 10 percent confidence level using a two-tailed
test; na. indicates the variable is not applicable; -- indicates the variable was not included in the study.
4'Tsbtc 4. Mcitns of .clccted variables.1975-1982PSID.by age groupand mobilitystatus
Lesathan25 25to34 351o44 45to54
AltStayer. Movcr All Stayer.Mover.All Stayer. Mover.AllStayer. Movers
Covcrcd .60 .77 .52 .69 .77 .61 .73 .81 .60 .74 .78 .65
by pension
Capital loss .82 1.19 .542.933.322.42 6.537.205.10 8.509.83 5.51
In $1000
(if covered)
Avcragehourly 3.92 4.663.545.165.454.88 5.685.965.24 6.196.57 5.47
compcnsation
Union member .31 .44 .25 .32 .39 .25 .39 .38 .41 .36 .36 .38
Year. 1.80 2.19 1.613.774.443.10 8.018.886.6611.4312.429.56
of aervice
Mule .88 .89 .88 .89 .91 .87 .86 .87 .85 .86 .87 .85
Black .34 .28 .37 .30 .29 .31 .31 .30 .34 .26 .22 .32
N 169 57 112 404203 201 250152 98 288 188 100
(100%) (34%) (66%) (100%) (50%) (50%) (100%) (61%) (39%) (100%) (65%) (35%)


















Federal marginal tax rate .18 .23
(.08) (.08)
Hourly compensation before tax 3.99 6.04
(2.06) (2.95)
Average hourly earnings 3.99 5.95
(2.06) (2.88)
Hourly compensation after taX 3.16 4.55
(1.42) (1.89)













Note: Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
43Table 6. Estimatcs of three equation model of pension coverage and mobility.
System Aa
Equation (4) (5) (6)
System Ba
(4') (5) (6)
Age -.006 -.013 -.006 -.008 -.012 -.005
(.006) (.006) (.011) (.007) (.006) (.012)
[-.0021[-.004][-.002] [-.002][-.004][-.001]
Tenureb .016 -.043 -.181 .029-.034 -.188
(.034)(.056) (.064) (.035)(.056) (.053)
Tcnuresquarcd/l00-.002 .207 .685 -.012 .191 .696
(.121)(.148) (.224) (.130)(.148) (.210)
[.004][-.005][-.035] [.007][-.003][-.0401
Union .599 -.057 .085 .590 -.110 .001
(.119)(.154) (.424) (.120)(.174) (.515)
[.144][-.019] [.026] [.155][-.037] [.0003]
Number of children .040 .012 -.038 .045 .008 -.040
(.038)(.035) (.069) (.039)(.036) (.068)
[.0111[.004][-.012] [.012][.003][-.013]
Black .247 .017 -.122 .229 .042 -.155
(.121)(.127) (.281) (.121)(.132) (.285)
[.059][.006] [-.038] [.059][.0141[-.050]
Years of schooling .019 -.008 -.0002 .022-.019 -.005
(.025)(.025) (.049) (.025) (.027)(.052)
[.005][-.003][-.0001] [.0061[-.006][-.002]
Male .379 .322 .755 .489 .249 .712
(.219)(.238) (.439) (.236)(.253)(.551)
[.109][.102] [.240] [.139][.082][.226]
Not married .252 .314 .470 .372 .265 .448
(.192) (.180) (.390) (.212) (.182) (.458)
[.065][.109] [.139] [.0911[.093] [.139]
44Table 6. (continued)
a System A a System B
Equation (4) (5) (6) (4') (5) (6)
Hourly compensation.162 .174
before tax (.033) (.032)
[.042] [.046]
Federal marginal .006 .004








Hourly compensation .030 -.178 .010 -.217
after tax (.043) (.195) (.050) (.208)
[.0 10][-.055] [.003][-.069]
Already vested .090 -.03 5
(.393) (.393)
[.052] [-.012]










log 1 -1177.0 -1177.6
aBcrndt et al. asymptotic standard errors appear in parentheses and sample means of the
derivative of the probability function arc in brackets. Each equation contains 5 occupation and
6 indubstry dummies; (5) and (6) also contain 3 region dummies.
Partial derivatives for tenure are reported beneath the tenure squared estimates.
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